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T A K I N G S
The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits governmental
taking of private property for public
use unless just compensation is paid
to the owner. U.S. CONST. amend. V,
cl. 4. More than 70 years ago in
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court,
observed that "the general rule at
least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if reg-
ulation goes too far it will be recog-
nized as a taking" that requires the
governmental actor to compensate
the landowner. However, the Court
in Pennsylvania Coal also recog-
nized that governments possess
police powers to protect important
public health and safety interests
and that governments could not
operate if compensation were
required for every exercise of the
police power that might diminish
the value of private property.
Since the Court's Pennsylvania
Coal decision, one of the most
complex, confusing, and contentious
debates in constitutional law has
focused on determining when, in
Justice Holmes's words, an exercise
of the police power has "gone too
far." In this Takings Clause case, the
C L A U S E
extent to which government may
regulate the use of private property
without triggering the just compen-
sation requirement is hotly contest-
ed once again.
The case asks when a government's
land use regulation has so interfered
with a landowner's use of his or her
property that a claim for just com-
pensation may be considered ready
- in legal parlance, ripe - for
adjudication. In prior cases, the
Supreme Court has indicated that a
lawsuit seeking compensation for an
unconstitutional taking is not ripe
for judicial decision unless and until
the governmental agency enforcing
the regulation has reached a final,
definitive position regarding how it
will apply the regulations at issue to
the land involved. Now, the Court
has an opportunity to delineate
when land use regulation has so
affected rights of property owner-
ship that the landowner is entitled
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dential lot, to protect the
Lake's water quality.
Unable to use the proper-
ty, Mrs. Suitum filed suit
seeking compensation.
The case was dismissed
because she had not tried
to sell development rights
granted by the agency in
recognition of the con-
struction ban. At issue in
this case is the point at
which federal courts
must hear a landowner's
case when land use regu-
lation bars all, or virtual-
ly all, use of the land.
Patrick C. McGinley is professor of
law at West Virginia University
College of Law, Morgantown, WV;
(304) 293-6823.
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ISSUE
Must the owner of a residential lot
first sell or attempt to sell develop-
ment rights and apply for planning
agency approval of the sale of those
rights before a Takings Clause claim
is ripe for judicial review, when the
planning agency already has con-
cluded that no viable use of the land
will be permitted?
FACTS
Many state, regional, and local
governments have recognized that
development of land for industrial,
commercial, residential, and other
uses can have serious adverse envi-
ronmental impact. Such adverse
effects may harm other important
public interests including a commu-
nity's economic development, tax
base, and quality of life.
Various techniques have been used
in land use regulation to minimize
environmental harm. In this case,
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
(the "TRPA" or the "Agency")
enacted a comprehensive regulatory
scheme directed at protecting the
quality of Lake Tahoe's waters.
The TRPA was created in 1969 by
an interstate compact between
California and Nevada after both
states became alarmed at the deteri-
oration of Lake Tahoe's water quali-
ty. The compact required the TRPA
to adopt and enforce a regional plan
of resource conservation and order-
ly development.
Notwithstanding creation of the
TRPA, the Lake's water quality
continued to decline. In 1980 the
compact was amended extensively
to reflect an urgent concern over
mounting threats to the ecology of
the region.
Pursuant to the amended compact,
the Agency adopted a new regional
plan in 1987. The 1987 plan con-
tained regulations relating to resi-
dential development in the Lake
Tahoe Basin. Central to this case,
the plan created a special classifica-
tion for property located within a
stream environment zone ("SEZ"),
defined as an environmentally sensi-
tive area that conveys surface water
from upland areas into Lake Tahoe
and its tributaries. SEZs account for
17,700 acres of the 205,250 acres
that make up the Lake Tahoe Basin.
Vegetation contained in the SEZs
filters pollution-causing runoff and
maintains soil stability. Any disrup-
tion of the land in an SEZ releases
contaminants into Lake Tahoe and
surrounding waters. The 1987 plan
emphasized the importance of the
SEZs and their essential role in
achieving environmental thresholds
for water quality, vegetation preser-
vation, and soil conservation.
Consequently, while the 1987 plan
contained a system for gradual
development of unbuilt residential
lots in the Lake Tahoe Basin, it
prohibited development on lots
located in the SEZs.
As part of its regulation of the use of
private residential land, the TRPA
also created a system of transferable
development credits that property
owners must possess in order to
build. Thus, while property situated
in SEZs must be kept in its natural
state, owners were awarded develop-
ment credits which they could sell.
Bernadine Suitum's undeveloped
residential lot fell wholly within an
SEZ. As an owner of SEZ land,
Suitum was allocated four develop-
ment credits that she could attempt
to sell to other owners of non-SEZ
land that could be developed for res-
idential use. Purchasers of those
credits are allowed to develop their
property more extensively than
would have been possible had they
not bought the credits. For example,
acquiring additional credits might
allow a non-SEZ property owner to
construct a considerably larger
house than would be possible
without the credits.
The Agency's regulations provide
that landowners in Suitum's situa-
tion, whose property lies within an
SEZ, may appeal the SEZ designa-
tion to its governing board. Suitum
did so but without success.
Suitum, however, made no attempt
to sell the credits that had been
allocated to her by the TRPA.
Although the Agency's approval is
not required in order for a landown-
er in Suitum's situation to seek to
sell development credits, the
Agency must review and approve
the purchaser of the credits before
any sale is finalized. This approval
process confirms the eligibility of
the buyer to use the credits being
purchased. In addition, before any
sale of credits may be approved, the
TRPA requires that the seller exe-
cute and record deed restrictions
permanently removing the SEZ-situ-
ated land from any future develop-
ment. The seller is also required to
execute an instrument providing for
the perpetual maintenance of the
SEZ land in its natural state.
No further administrative review of
the decision placing Suitum's prop-
erty within an SEZ was available
under the Agency's regulations, and
the regulations did not include any
provision for seeking variances,
waivers, or other exceptions from a
final SEZ determination by the
Agency's governing board. After
losing her administrative appeal,
Suitum filed suit in federal district
court, claiming various constitution-
al violations. In particular, Suitum
alleged that the TRPA had taken her
property without just compensation
in violation of the Takings Clause
and that she was entitled to just
compensation.
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Suitum argued that the various
development-rights credits available
under the TRPA's 1987 plan had no
value and that the development-
rights transfer program provided no
remedy for the unconstitutional tak-
ing of her property. She asserted
that marketing the development-
rights credits would have been
futile and was not a prerequisite
to filing suit.
The district court, in an unreported
decision, concluded that Suitum's
case was not ripe for adjudication.
The court held that because Suitum
had failed to pursue transfer of her
development-rights credits, there
was an insufficient basis on which it
could determine how the TRPA's
regulations applied to her property
and whether the reach of the regula-
tions constituted an unconstitution-
al taking.
Suitum appealed the district court's
decision to the Ninth Circuit which
affirmed. The appeals court held
that the transfer of development-
rights credits constitutes a use of
SEZ property within the regulatory
scheme. The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that until Suitum uses the property
in the manner permitted by the reg-
ulations, that is, until she attempts
to transfer the development-rights
credits allocated to her, a trial court
would be unable to make a determi-
nation that a taking had occurred.
In essence, the Ninth Circuit, like
the district court, concluded that
Suitum's case was not ripe for adju-
dication. 80 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.
1996).
The Ninth Circuit's decision is now
before the Supreme Court which
granted Suitum's petition for a writ
of certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
CASE ANALYSIS
Suitum first argues that the TRPA's
denial of her building plan was final,
thus her constitutional claims were
ripe for adjudication under the
Supreme Court's decision in
Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In
Williamson County, the Court held
that a Takings Clause claim based
on land use regulation is not ripe
until the regulatory agency has
reached "a final, definitive position
regarding how it will apply the
regulations at issue to the particular
land in question." 473 U.S. at 191.
Suitum contends that the essential
concern of the Court in Williamson
County as well as in later cases has
been an "insistence on knowing the
I nature and extent of permitted
development" before adjudicating a
Takings Clause claim. See, e.g.,
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351
(1986). She argues that the TRPA's
decision bars her from any develop-
ment whatsoever and that the
Agency's allocation to her of trans-
ferable development-rights credits
in no way alters the fact that it has
taken a final and definitive position
that she may not develop her land
for any purpose.
Suitum also maintains that the
TRPA's decision prohibiting her
from using her property is final. It
was not necessary, therefore, for her
to sell or attempt to sell the devel-
opment-rights credits in order for a
court to determine the economic
impact of the Agency's regulation.
On this point, Suitum insists that
generally accepted appraisal meth-
ods could have been used at trial to
determine the extent to which the
value of her property had been
diminished because of the Agency's
land use regulations.
Suitum closes by arguing that the
Ninth Circuit's acceptance of the
TRPA's transferable development-
rights scheme undermines the
Court's categorical takings rule
which holds that land use regulation
that totally extinguishes a property
owner's right to use the property is
a per se taking under the Takings
Clause requiring just compensation.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
Suitum emphasizes that the TRPA's
regulations require her to sell her
development-rights credits, and,
when she effectuates a sale, she is
required to execute deed restric-
tions extinguishing all development
rights in the property and requiring
the land to be maintained perma-
nently in its natural state. In this
context, the Ninth Circuit's require-
ment that she first attempt to sell
the development credits allocated
to her negates Lucas's holding
that a taking has occurred when a
landowner's development rights are
completely extinguished. Says
Suitum, under existing Supreme
Court precedent, there was no
reason for the lower courts to dis-
miss her Takings Clause claim on
ripeness grounds when it is obvious
that a complete taking of her
property had occurred.
The TRPA responds with the con-
tention that Suitum has miscon-
strued the holding of Williamson
County. The Agency argues that
Williamson County requires more
than a final administrative decision
in order for Suitum's case to be ripe
for adjudication.
The Agency argues that in
Williamson County and other cases
the Court has focused on deriving
economic benefit from property
affected by land use regulation and
has defined economic benefit broad-
ly. In the Agency's view, the Court
has placed particular emphasis on
the value of the land and invest-
ment-backed profit expectations,
rather than on whether or not
construction is permitted.
(Continued on Page 338)
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The Agency relies on language from
Williamson County that "until the
commission determines that no
variances will be granted, it is
impossible for the jury to find, on
this record, whether respondent will
be unable to derive economic bene-
fit from the land." 473 U.S. at 191.
Similarly, the Agency asserts that
because Suitum failed to reasonably
pursue the sale of her development
rights, it was impossible for the dis-
trict court to determine if she would
be unable to derive any economic
benefit from her land as regulated.
The TRPA emphasizes that in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), the
Court held that the existence of a
valuable, transferable development
right was sufficient to negate the
Takings Clause claim in that case.
Similarly, in this case, the district
court had before it evidence that
the development-rights credits
granted Suitum had significant
market value that could be used to
obtain economic benefit. Thus, no
judicial determination could be
made that a taking had occurred
unless and until Suitum made a
reasonable effort to sell those rights.
The TRPA also responds that
Suitum is wrong in suggesting that
the Ninth Circuit's decision effec-
tively nullifies the Court's holding in
Lucas. Lucas, the Agency asserts,
held that only when an owner of
land is deprived of all economically
beneficial or productive use of the
land has there been a categorical or
per se taking triggering the Takings
Clause requirement of just compen-
sation. Thus, reasons the TRPA, the
district court first had to ascertain if
Suitum's property had been
deprived of all economically benefi-
cial or productive use before it
could find a categorical taking of
property under Lucas. But, reiter-
ates the Agency, the district court
could not undertake this analysis
because Suitum had not attempted
to make any use of the develop-
ment-rights credits.
While Suitum relies on Lucas's
emphasis on land use regulation
that leaves a landowner without any
economically beneficial or produc-
tive options by requiring that the
land remain in its natural condition,
the Agency contends that construc-
tion is only one of many uses to
which property may be dedicated.
As opposed to the situation in
Lucas in which it was undisputed
that the property was rendered
valueless by land use regulation,
Suitum's property, argues the
Agency, may retain considerable
economic value, the extent of which
cannot be determined unless and
until she makes a reasonable effort
to sell her transferable development
rights. In other words, Suitum actu-
ally never received a final Agency
decision concerning the use of her
property because she did not
attempt to sell her development-
rights credits. It is for that reason
alone, argues the Agency, that her
case was not ripe for adjudication.
SIGNIFICANCE
Limitations on the rights of private
property ownership have been the
subject of heated debate during the
last decade and have led to the
enactment of private property
protection laws in many states.
Proponents of land use regulation to
benefit public interests such as
environmental protection oppose
such legislation, claiming that the
Constitution already strikes an
appropriate balance between pro-
tecting public and private property
rights.
At least since Penn Central, some
governmental land use planners and
environmental regulators have
attempted to soften the impact of
land use regulations on property
owners by creating transferable
development rights and similar
"compensatory" mechanisms.
Bernadine Suitum's case gives the
Supreme Court an opportunity to
review these regulatory strategies to
determine the extent to which they
may be used to negate a Takings
Clause claim.
If the Court affirms the Ninth
Circuit's decision that courts cannot
determine whether a taking has
occurred until a landowner has
made a reasonable effort to sell
transferable development rights and
the land use regulatory agency has
been approached to approve the
sale, land use planners will have a
green light to continue their cre-
ative attempts at regulating land use
without running afoul of Takings
Clause proscriptions. And if the
Court decides that Suitum's claim
was ripe and should have been
heard by the district court, the
decision will provide guidance as to
when federal courts can dispense
with an agency's definition of a final
administrative decision and adjudi-
cate a Takings Clause claim.
More importantly, if the Court
deems Suitum's case ripe for judicial
consideration, it will at least implic-
itly call into question the viability of
land use regulators' attempts to
avoid Takings Clause claims through
devices like transferable develop-
ment rights. Such a holding also
would clarify the Court's categorical
Takings Clause analysis first articu-
lated in Lucas. Thus, when land use
regulations effectively prohibit all
viable economic use of an owner's
property, any attempt by govern-
ment regulators to avoid a Takings
Clause claim through devices like
the TRPA's transferable development
rights will be to no avail. Such a rul-
ing would put environmental and
land use regulators on notice that
severely restricting or prohibiting
use of real property may trigger
obligations to compensate the
Issue No. 5338
landowner, a constraint that would
greatly impede the ability of state
and local governments to regulate
land use in order to further environ-
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